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Abstract
To the surprise of many Canadians, environmental regulation in
Canada has been much less stringent than that in the U.S. since at
least the 1970s. The principal reason given for this difference in
stringency has been the process by which environmental law has been
formulated. Canadian environmental law has typically been made in
a very closed and informal fashion, providing industry with
considerable power to influence policy but denying the public
significant access to policy-makers. In the U.S. the system has been
much more open and formal and provides greater opportunities for
public participation. This rationale has lead to an increase in public
participation rights in the environmental area in Canada.
This paper examines the potential effect of increasing public
participation rights. Such rights should result in greater information
to and pressure on policy-makers. However, as such rights tend to
lower costs of access for both the public and for regulated parties, it
is not immediately clear how they will affect the relative stringency
of environmental law. A factor which has greater impact on the
ability of the public or public interest groups to act is the
(increasingly) de-centralized nature of environmental regulation in
Canada relative to the U.S. This tends to decrease the relative power
of public interest groups to apply pressure on legislators by increasing
their costs of action, reducing the ability of regulators to deal with
extra-territorial effects and increasing the relative power of industry.
In addition, while there has been an increase in public
participation in Canada, it is not an unquestionable benefit in all
cases. The public and regulators may have different views of
environmental priorities. These differences may be due to either
public attention to qualitative aspects of risk which are not apparent
to regulators or to "rationality" problems of the public in perceiving
relative risks. As a result, to the extent that increased public
participation in Canada in the formulation of environmental law leads
to regulation based on "irrationalities" by the public, such
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increase may actually lead to less optimal environmental regulation.
A new institutional structure may be required to mitigate such
concerns.
I. Introduction
There has been a great deal of concern lately about the
stringency of Canada's environmental regulations. This has been
heightened by a recent report which stated that Ontario had the third
highest total releases and transfers of pollutants in North America,
behind only Texas and Tennessee.' In fact, although Canadians have
in general been quite smug about their environmental record
compared to the U.S., Canadian regulation has been less stringent
than American since the 1970s and, despite some convergence in
stringency over the past ten years, remains so in many areas.2
Why has there been this disparity in stringency of
environmental law between Canada and the U.S.? Institutional
differences, in particular differences in the ability of the public to
participate in policy decisions, have been seen as playing a key role
in this disparity.3 The Canadian system, especially prior to the mid-
I See generally COUNCIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, TAKING
STOCK: NORTH AMERICAN POLLUTANT RELEASES AND TRANSFERS, 1994
(1997)(the comparison is based on 1994 data from the Toxics Release Inventory
in the U.S. and the National Pollutant Release Inventory in Canada).
2 See George Hoberg, Comparing Canadian Performance in Environmental
Policy, in CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ECOSYSTEMS POLITICS AND
PROCESS 246, 260-62 (Robert Boardman ed., 1992) [hereinafter Hoberg,
Comparing]. See generally Andrew J. Green, Public Participation and
Environmental Policy Outcomes (1997)(unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Green, Public Participation].
3 The importance of institutions to the ability of government to act is an
unresolved question, see R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, Assessing the
Effects ofInstitutions, in DO INSTITUTIONS MATrER? GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 1, 1-41 (Weaver & Rockman eds.
1993)(comparing parliamentary and presidential government institutions). See also
George Hoberg, Sleeping With an Elephant: The American Influence on Canadian
Environmental Regulation, 11 J. PUB. POL'Y 107 (1991) [hereinafter Hoberg,
1999]
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1980s, has been relatively closed and informal, providing industry
with considerable power to influence policy while leaving the public
without any serious manner in which to access policy-makers. The
U.S. system, on the other hand, is more open and formal and provides
the public and public interest groups with greater opportunity to
ensure their preferences are reflected in environmental policy through
greater ability to access judicial review and to participate in policy
decisions. As a result, the traditional argument is that Canadian
environmental law was less stringent, possibly under-regulating
environmental risk, due to the significant relative power of industry.4
Have such institutional differences led to differences in
environmental law and policy in Canada and the U.S. and, if so, how?
There has been no satisfactory explanation for why such institutional
differences would have such a significant impact. This paper
examines the role of two inter-related factors: public participation
rights and the degree of decentralization of environmental decision-
making. The key will be to determine how these institutional
characteristics shape the incentives facing decision-makers, affected
parties and the general public and the effect this is likely to have on
environmental law and policy. This has important implications for
"reforms" underway in Canada such as the increased grafting of
American-style public participation rights onto the current Canadian
Sleeping] (other causes of the difference in environmental policy have been
suggested as a lag in Canada due to policy emulation). Convergence in information
received by regulators and an increase in demand in Canada for environmental
controls. While these factors likely play some role in policy differences, they do
not explain the convergence in policy over the past decade. Canadian regulators
have relied on information from, and the example of, U.S. regulators to aid in the
setting of environmental standards and guidelines, certainly throughout the 1970's
and 1980's. Levels of public concern about the environment in Canada and the
U.S. followed very similar patterns from the early 1970's and 1980's. See generally
Green, Public Participation, supra note 2.
4 See, e.g., George Hoberg, Environmental Policy: Alternative Styles, in
GOVERNING CANADA: INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 307, 328-29(Michael M.
Atkinson ed., 1993) [hereinafter Hoberg, Alternative Styles]; Andrew J. Roman &
Kelly Hoey, The Regulatory Framework, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND BUSINESS
IN CANADA 53, 64-65 (Geoffrey Thompson et al. eds., 1993).
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system and the recent signing of the Canada-Wide Accord on
Environmental Harmonization by the federal government and all of
the provinces and territories other than Quebec.
Part II of the paper briefly sets out a model of policy-making
based on the incentives ofpolicy-makers and interested parties to take
action. Differences in the ability of the public to participate in policy
decisions in Canada and the U.S. and how this impacts interest group
behaviour are set out in Part III while the role of centralization of
decision-making is discussed in Part IV. Part V examines how these
institutional differences are likely to affect environmental law.
Finally, Part VI examines the potential implications for
environmental law of the increase in public participation along with
the possible effect of the recent move in Canada towards further
decentralization of environmental decision-making through the
Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization.
II. Incentives and Policy-Making
No objective means have been devised, or are likely possible,
for making environmental policy decisions. Moreover, demand by
the public for environmental protection is not self-actualizing or
independently extant5. As a result, the location of decision-making
can be determinative of the trade-offs between potentially competing
considerations such as the risk of harm to human health or the
environment and the costs of regulation such as the loss of jobs.
Institutional factors go a long way towards determining who the
decision-maker is and the nature of the resulting policy by
determining the incentives on and ability of the various agents to
5 See Richard Pildes & Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96-99 (1995). See generally ANDREW J. GREEN, CENTER FOR
STUDY OF STATE AND MARKET, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND POLICY: THE
"AMERICANIZATION" OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CANADA (1997)
[hereinafter GREEN, CENTER FOR STUDY]
1999]
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enact or to respond to the actions of other agents.6 Institutions
determine the relative power of various groups in the decision making
process by setting their expected benefits of action. Where the
benefits of action for a particular group (in the sense of obtaining a
gain or avoiding a loss) are greater than the costs of action (including
costs of organization and information and institutional costs), that
group is likely to act.7 Institutions raise and lower the expected
benefits of action. For example, the costs of participating in
regulatory decisions is affected by whether individuals can participate
as of right. The costs of an individual or group acting where there is
a right to participate are obviously lower than where the group is not
permitted to participate or must seek some type of approval for
participation. For a given distribution of direct costs and benefits
from regulation (such as compliance costs for industry or health risks
for affected parties). Different institutional structures can lead to
different patterns of action.
This provides for an opportunity for rent-seeking by various
agents. Rent-seeking is an attempt by a party to use its powers to
affect government regulation to obtain excess benefit or profits
6 All agents (including legislators, bureaucrats, industry, public interest
groups and the general public) are assumed to be boundedly rational and limitedly
self-altruistic. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency
Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games and Accountability, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 188 (1994). This means that the general assumptions of
economics about the rational, self-interested actor are not seen as wholly true as
there are limits on the ability of individuals to act in a "rational manner" and there
can be an element of altruism or interest beyond narrow self-interest which
motivates them. The result is that there is no definitive answer to how policy
decisions are made but there can be some general comments about tendencies and
directions. The limits on rationality are discussed more fully below.
7 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J.
ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3, 10-13(1997)(discussing cost-benefit analysis in decision
making). See generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976)(arguing against Stigler's cost-benefit
method of decision making); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1 994)(a more
recent exposition of the cost benefit debate).
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(called "rents") over what is "optimal" at the expense of other
parties! The classic example is a small group using its ability to
organize cheaply or its control over information to push for
regulations which preclude other parties from entering a market or
otherwise affect its costs or profits in a manner which shifts outcomes
away from "optimal" policy and provides it with rents. A group can
be thought of as rent-seeking if it attempts to obtain a benefit through
pushing for non-optimal policy in the form of either specific
regulations or non-promulgation of regulations such as, for example,
industry pushing for lax standards which allow it to make profits by
shifting some of the costs (in this case of environmental harm) onto
others.
Decisions result from the related factors of incentives for
affected parties to act and for political decision-makers to respond to
such action. An institutional structure can provide a policy maker
with the incentive to respond to a particular group's input which in
turn provides that group with a higher expected benefit from action
than a system which disconnects the policy decision from the group's
input. Policy makers are seen as having both incentives and
constraints. Legislators' incentives in both Canada and the U.S. are
assumed to arise mainly from the potential to gain votes, either
directly from a particular action or indirectly through obtaining
8 While there are obviously concerns about the underlying framework such
as the commensurability of costs and benefits and the possibility of obtaining
sufficient, meaningful information, "optimal" pollution policy can be at least
notionally thought of as that which equates the marginal cost of pollution control
and the marginal benefit. See generally GREEN, CENTER FOR STUDY, supra note
5. This recognizes the trade-offs involved in environmental policy and may be able
to incorporate non-standard costs and benefits such as those related to distribution.
Rent-seeking is an attempt to move policy away from "optimal" regulation in order
to gain a benefit (such as profits or, in the case of environmental groups, greater
environmental protection) at the expense of others (for example, in the form of
increased environmental risk, jobs or profits).
1999]
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political resources or support which help in the effort for re-election.'
Bureaucrats engaged in the decision-making process act in a manner
which is consistent with the goals and desires of the politicians,
particularly at the senior levels. In Canada, this means that senior
bureaucrats act so as not to harm the interests of the Minister in order
to preserve theirjobs and this filters through the department.'0 In the
U.S., these incentives arise from the need to avoid executive or
congressional oversight and for the Director of the Environmental
Protection Agency to avoid losing his or her position.
Even if public officials are acting on a purely "public interest"
basis, they are under constraints from costs such as those of acquiring
information or of needing cooperation from the regulated parties to
ensure compliance where there are insufficient resources to undertake
enforcement. This provides power to the party which can provide
such information or whose cooperation is required. However, this is
somewhat circular as these effects are a function of the resources
provided to regulate a particular risk which is again a function of the
power of parties to influence decisions. An important additional
constraint arises from judicial decisions which can dictate or at least
influence policy decisions. There may also be ideological constraints
which limit certain actors from making certain decisions."
9 See Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Positive Political Economy of
Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WALLACE E. OATES 89, 91-93 (Arvind
Panagariya et al. eds., 1999). The authors attempt to describe the market for
"effective political support" more fully.
1o See generally T.F. Schrecker, Environmental Law and the Greening of
Government: a Cynical Guide, in ENVIRONMENTALLAWAND BUSINESS IN CANADA
(Geoffrey Thompson et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Schrecker, Greening of
Government]..
11 See Keohane et al., supra note 9, at 97.
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I. Public Participation and Incentives
A. Institutional Differences: 1970 to the Mid-1980s
The Canadian and American institutional frameworks for
public participation were sharply divergent between 1970 and the
mid-1980s, both in terms of rights of access of interested parties to
policy-makers and the structure of government. These factors help
establish the balance of power between competing groups.
1. Access to Policy Makers
The costs of participation in standard-setting by various
interested parties were much lower in the U.S. than in Canada during
this period due to the more formal, open nature of the American
system. Most obviously, the U.S. system provided more rights to
participate in the standard-setting process, in particular under the
detailed notice and comment procedures of the Administrative
Procedures Act. 2 There were also substantial public participation
rights under both substantive legislation and judicially-created rules.
This was aided by the Freedom of Information Act, which provided
a lever for public interest groups to extract information from the
government necessary for participation. However, the influence of
these groups on the outcome was and is variable due to retention by
agencies of control over the final decision.'"
By contrast, public participation opportunities in Canada have
in the past been very limited. Rule-making has been characterized by
closed and informal negotiations between industry and regulators. 4
12 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1999).
13 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTALPOLICY 13-
16, 126-27 (1995).
14 See Lennart J. Lundquist, Do Political Structures Matter in
EnvironmentalPolitics? The Case ofAirPollution Control in Canada, Sweden and
the United States, 17 CAN. PUB. ADMIN 119, 138 (1974); Peter N. Nemetz et al.,
Social Regulation in Canada: An Overview and Comparison with the American
1999]
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Consultation with wider groups has been at the discretion of the
regulator and, although it did occur, its use was inconsistent and
unenforceable. 5 Moreover there was no access to information
legislation in Canada until the early 1980s. The U.S. Freedom of
Information Act was enacted in 1966 while the first such Canadian
legislation was enacted in New Brunswick in 1978 and took effect in
1980.6
Public interest groups and regulated parties also have greater
access to the enforcement process in the U.S. through citizen suit
provisions and formal rights to participate. While there are some
negotiations between the government and the regulated party when
attempting to reach a settlement in the case of a prosecution in the
U.S., the Canadian system of implementation and enforcement has
been based to a much larger extent on bilateral negotiations between
industry and the government. Negotiations occur over the costs and
feasibility of achieving standards or of meeting compliance schedules
and public interest groups have traditionally been excluded from this
process. For example, establishment and enforcement of control
orders in Ontario have been based mainly on such bipartite
negotiations.
The result of this difference in rights of access to participation
at all levels of the policy process was a much higher cost of accessing
policy makers in Canada. The lack of guaranteed access for
environmental groups in Canada meant that they faced the increased
burden of attempting to induce the decision-maker to exercise its
discretion to permit participation or of finding some other avenue of
influence. Given that regulated parties in both countries had access
to policy makers, environmental groups in Canada would take
Model, 14 POL'Y STUD. J. 580, 594-98 (1986).
is See T. F. SCHRECKER, LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 19-20 (1984).
16 SeeNils Zimmerman et al., CommunityRight To Know: ImprovingPublic
Information About Toxic Chemicals, 5 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 95, 96-97 (1995).
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relatively less action to counter any influence of industry with respect
to an issue which has the same distribution of costs and benefits in
each country.
2. Points of Access
Costs of participation were also lower in the U.S. because the
government structure is based on separation of powers, which
provides more points of access to the policy process than the
parliamentary system. There was and is considerable executive
oversight of agency action in the U.S. in the form of either executive
replacement of agency officials where the agency is independent 7 or
of oversight by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The
OMB cannot stop regulations but it has been able to use its oversight
powers to force changes." Congress also retains power over agency
action through oversight hearings, control over budgets and the
ultimate power of legislation. Interested parties then have the
opportunity to influence decisions by accessing any or all of the
President, Congress, the EPA or the judiciary. This ability to choose
different points of access is particularly important where the
executive and the Congress are under the control of different political
parties.
17 Many American agencies are said to be weak because their key personnel
are political appointees and are subject to removal by the President. See Weaver
& Rockman, supra note 3, at 32. However, the "independent" agencies may also
be susceptible to political opinion and especially pressure from well-organized
private groups because they are not protected by presidential oversight. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 407, 439-40
(1990).
18 During the Reagan era, regulations were required to pass cost-benefit
analysis and the OMB used this requirement to slow down the promulgation of new
agency regulations. By threatening to delay regulations sufficiently to make the
agency miss statutory deadlines, the OMB was able to attain changes in some
regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
1999]
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As the legislative and executive functions are combined in
Canada, there are fewer routes for interest groups to take to obtain
action on policies than in the U.S. 9 While some executive oversight
is wielded by the Treasury Board, the main source of power in
Canada at both the federal and the provincial levels was and is the
Cabinet. They are the source of legislation and, in general,
regulations while line departments implement and enforce these
powers. Accountability is meant to come from legislative oversight
since ministers have the responsibility of both managing a portfolio
as well as representing their constituents. Opposition in the House of
Commons and review by the Senate, along with pressure from voters
at election time to which such opposition is intended to give rise, is
to act as a check on Cabinet's powers to set agendas and make trade-
offs in the public interest. However, while interest groups do have
access to the government through opposition questioning, the
opposition often lacks the time and, where the affected group is not
politically powerful, the incentive to become involved in the often
complex issues of risk regulation. This lack of access is exacerbated
by strict party discipline in Canada so that, unlike the U.S., there is
generally not effective access on issues which are not part of the
government's agenda.20
These structures give rise to varying incentives on policy
makers. In the U.S. one of the principal reasons given for strict
standards and requirements being set out in legislation is a distrust by
Congress of the executive. The strict wording is designed to set
(court enforced) boundaries within which the EPA and the executive
are to act.21 This can be explained in terms of self-interest as
19 See KATHRYN HARRISON & GEORGE HOBERG, RISK, SCIENCE AND
POLITICS: REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
8-9 (1994) [hereinafter HARRISON & HOBERG, RISK]; SCHRECKER, supra note 15,
at 17.
20 See Kathryn Harrison & George Hoberg, Setting the Environmental
Agenda in Canada and the United States: The Cases of Dioxin and Radon, 24
CAN. J. POL. SCI. 3, 26 (1991).
21 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 39-40 (1993); Mashaw, supra note 6, at 206.
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Congress is acting so as to obtain credit from the electorate for taking
action rather than allowing the executive to be perceived to be the
driving force in regulating risks which are important to the public.22
In Canada, the lack of separation of powers means that there is no
incentive for such detailed legislation and considerable discretion is
built into the system to let the government follow its own course.2
Institutional differences lead to lower costs of participation in
the U.S. in this case as the separation of powers provides more points
of access to policymakers, thereby increasing the probability of
obtaining a sympathetic hearing at some level. In Canada the only
real avenue is the Cabinet and to a lesser extent bureaucrats due to
weak political accountability and strict party discipline.
A related factor which decreases the cost of public interest
group action in the U.S. relative to Canada is the nature of regulatory
science.' 4 American agencies tend to use highly sophisticated
regulatory models and create very detailed rationales for their actions.
These principles and models tend to become the focus of considerable
debate in regulatory proceedings as they are open to public inspection
and criticism as well as judicial, legislative and executive oversight.
This has become particularly pronounced in the last decade as more
regulatory decisions become based on quantitative analysis.25
Conversely in Canada regulatory science has been much more closed
and regulators are less likely to rely on uniform models for
determining risk, instead relying on more qualitative models and
n See BREYER, supra note 21, at 40-42.
2 See Hoberg, Alternative Styles, supra note 4, at 336.
24 Regulatory science is taken to mean scientific analysis performed
specifically for the purpose ofregulation. For a detailed discussion of the differing
styles of regulatory science used in Canada and the U.S. in the context of the
regulation of toxic chemicals, see HARRISON & HOBERG, RISK, supra note 19, at
171-74.
25 See Sheila Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society, in
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE, 1, 29-30 (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander
eds., 1991). Jasanoffrelates this to a lack oftrust in experts and government in the
U.S.
1999]
182 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 6
safety margins.26 The assumptions and models used are much less the
focus of debate and, in particular, of judicial review with the result
that there is one less avenue through which interest groups can attack
a decision or gain information in Canada.
B. Public Participation in Canada: Post-1986
Has there been a change in public participation in Canada
since the mid-1980s? The greater number of points of access in the
U.S. which result from the differences between the parliamentary
system in Canada and the separation of powers in the U.S. remain the
same. Canadian governments are unwilling to give up the power to
make trade-offs between economic and other interests which makes
it unlikely that the power to make environmental policy decisions will
be taken from government ministries and given to regulatory agencies
as in the U.S.27
However, a change did occur in the rights of participation of
citizens in the policy process over the past decade. The former
system of public participation relying on the discretion of regulators
is gradually changing in Canada with the advent of policies requiring
limited notice and comment procedures and the inclusion of
consultation requirements in new statutes. Environmental bills of
rights recently introduced in several Canadian jurisdictions include
greater access for the public to the policy process and the federal
government has made movement towards increasing access of the
public.2" These changes attempt to include a wider range of interest
26 See id. Jasanoff argues that the British regulators use less formal models
than the U.S. regulators because they are relatively insulated from oversight and are
given greater deference. The same would hold true in Canada, which follows more
the British style of accountability.
27 See generally Schrecker, Greening of the Government, supra note 10.
28 The federal government has developed policies for greater consultation
of the public and publishes Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements for proposed
regulations.
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groups in decision-making. 9 In addition, there has been an increase
in the information cheaply available to citizens through Access to
Information Acts which were put in place in Canada in the early
1980s as well as government assembled sources of environmental
information such as the environmental registry under the
Environmental Bill of Rights in Ontario.
These changes tend to lower the marginal cost of action by
interest groups by opening a secured line of participation in decision-
making. Interestingly, the timing of these changes corresponds to the
beginnings of convergence of policy outcomes between Canada and
the U.S.3" At first glance, this gives credence to the now standard
view of the deficiencies of Canadian regulatory institutions. Bilateral
negotiations between industry and government provided little
opportunity for public input. When combined with greater resources
and organizational capacities for industry and a "weak state" in the
sense of being unable to withstand industry pressure, this institutional
29 For a discussion of the growth of multipartite bargaining in Canada., see
Hoberg, Alternative Styles, supra note 4, at 307,328-29. See also Grace Skogstad,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Politics of Environmental Protection in
Canada, in FEDERALISMANDTHEENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING
IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 103, 118-20(Kenneth Holland
et al. eds., 1996); Kathryn Harrison, Federalism, Environmental Protection and
Blame Avoidance, in NEW TRENDS IN CANADIAN FEDERALISM 414,425 (Francois
Rocher & Miriam Smith eds., 1995). While content of control orders in Ontario
under the OEPA has in the past been based mainly on such bipartite negotiations,
under the Ontario EBR there are greater participation and review rights for the
public for such policy instruments.
30 See generally Green, Public Participation, supra note 2.
1999]
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structure is felt to lead to a bias towards less stringent environmental
standards.3 The remedy is then seen as increased public involvement
in decision-making to provide an off-setting power which should
increase the stringency of environmental policy.
IV. Centralization and Environmental Law
There is a problem with this explanation of the causes of
differences in environmental law between Canada and the U.S. Both
the greater rights of participation and points of access also tend to
lower the costs of access for regulated parties. On their own it is not
clear how these institutional differences would affect the relative
stringency of environmental law. Even if the process is opened up in
line with the U.S. model, why would industry interests not still
outweigh public concerns? Industry would still have greater
resources and organizational capabilities and would still have
economic power arising from control over location of production.
Even with public consultation, there is still considerable discretion in
the hands of regulators both in Canada and the U.S. to determine
regulatory outcomes. Why has openness in the U.S. then apparently
led to more stringent regulations? The answer lies in the greater
degree of centralization of decision-making power in the U.S. and the
effect it has on the costs and benefits facing interested parties in each
country.
A. Centralization of Regulatory Power in Canada and the U.S.
Even though the U.S. Constitution does not clearly allocate to
the states or the federal government jurisdiction over certain areas of
risk, the federal government has been able to establish a wide range
31 See Nemetez et al., supra note 14, at 595; Hoberg, Alternative Styles,
supra note 4, at 328-29.
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of regulatory programs, particularly over the environment.32 This
centralizes policy-making in federal agencies and allows the
development of national standards. Some environmental statutes
grant the states a role in deciding how those standards are to be met.
For example, under the Clean Air Act, National Ambient Air Quality
Standards are to be achieved through state-devised programs (State
Implementation Plans) which allow the states to make trade-offs in
attainment of federal standards. Similarly, under the Clean Water
Act, states can take over issuance and enforcement of permits.33
However, in both cases the Environmental Protection Agency retains
the right to approve the state action.34
Canada also lacks clear constitutional delineation of
jurisdiction over the environment. As inthe United States, the federal
government has the power to regulate inter-jurisdictional trade and
commerce but Canadian courts have been unwilling to read this
power broadly and it is unlikely that it would support strong national
environmental regulation.35 There was judicial recognition in the past
of a limited federal jurisdiction over environmental regulation,
particularly under its power over coastal fisheries and its general
power of peace, order and good government ("POGG").36 Provincial
regulation is limited to matters which fall within the provincial
boundaries and which come under an enumerated provincial head of
32 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 13-15. This regulatory power is
largely based on the federal government's power over interstate trade and
commerce.
33 See Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of the EPA "s
Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards 55 J. L. &
ECON, 331, 337 (1990).
34 See PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW &
POLICY 250 (1994).
35 See generally Rodney Northey, Federalism and Comprehensive
Environmental Reform: Seeing Beyond the Murky Medium, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.
J. 127 (1989)(comparing American and Canadian federalism as it pertains to
environmental regulation).
36 See id at 152.
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power such as private and civil rights. 7 This was expanded in the
1980s to include wider provincial jurisdiction over non-renewable
resources as well as forestry and hydroelectric facilities.3 The
provinces have taken the lead in most areas of environmental
regulation as a result of these powers and the federal abdication of
power in the 1970s and 1980s.
Jurisdiction was largely untested in the 1970s and 1980s when
the federal government was more willing to allow the provinces to act
in the area of the environment.39 The federal government set national
guidelines and entered into agreements with the provinces to have the
provinces enforce them. These interprovincial agreements were the
main tool to avoid overlapping jurisdiction in the 1970s and 1980s,
although they may have been used by the provinces to limit federal
involvement as far as possible.4" The federal government eventually
largely abandoned even the guideline making role and limited
themselves to information gathering with little direct enforcement.4'
The Canadian federal government has attempted to take at
least a symbolically stronger role in environmental regulation over the
past decade. In the late 1980s it introduced the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA") 41 which was intended to
37 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.1 1, s.92(13)(formerly
British North America Act, 1867). These provincial powers may even extend
provincial environmental control to certain aspects of federal undertakings such as
railways. See Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Limited [1995] S.C.R. 1028.
38 See Grace Skogstad & Paul Kopas, Environmental Policy in a Federal
System: Ottawa and the Provinces, in CANADIAN ECOSYSTEMS, POLITICS AND
PROCESS, supra note 2, at 43, 45.
39 See Hoberg, Alternative Styles, supra note 4, at 314; Skogstad, supra note
29, at 107-109; Harrison, supra note 29, at 415-17.
40 See Harrison, supra note 29, at 422-23.
41 Harrison argues that the federal government backed out of environmental
regulation because there was little public concern over the environment.
Legislators saw no advantage in terms of electoral response and there were costs
of regulation from imposing restraints on industry. The provinces, on the other
hand, stayed in the area even in times of low public concern in order retain control
over development of natural resources. See id. at 417.
42 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., c. 16 (1985)(Can.).
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give the federal government the power to regulate toxic chemicals
"from cradle to grave". More recently, it has put in place greater
enforcement powers (including increasing maximum fines under the
Fisheries Act and gaining the power to issue permits) and
implemented new pulp and paper regulations under the Fisheries
Act.
43
The Supreme Court of Canada aided this move in 1988 by
providing a more solid basis for federal power in its decision in R. v.
Crown Zellerbach.4 It found that the federal government could
legislate in areas of "national concern" under POGG provided it only
deals with matters which are single, distinct and indivisible and did
not infringe excessively on provincial powers. Using this test, the
Court upheld federal government legislation regulating ocean
dumping even though it also applied to provincial waters.45 The
Supreme Court also forced the federal government to take a larger
role in environmental assessment by the courts and environmental
groups which eventually led to the enactment of the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act.46
This apparent increase in powers may be an attempt by the
federal government to appear to strengthen its role in order to take
credit for environmental protection in the face of increased public
43 The regulations lower the effluent limits for BOD, TSS and acute toxicity
and eliminate the distinction between old and new mills. There are also new limits
on emissions of dioxins and furans established under CEPA and under provincial
regulation. See Craig Gaston, Pulp and Paper Industry Compliance Costs, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 1993: STUDIES AND STATISTICS 19, 20 (Craig
Gaston ed. 1993).
44 See R. v. Crown Zellerbach [1988] S.C.R. 401.
45 See id. A strong dissent by La Forest J. (with Beetz J. and Lamer J.
concurring) found that ocean pollution was not distinct (i.e., there is no clear
boundary between fresh and salt water). He also found that upholding this federal
regulation would have the potential of allowing almost unlimited federal
encroachment on provincial powers as all polluting activity could be seen as having
an effect on ocean waters and thus would become subject to federal regulation.
46 Act of June 23, 1992, c. 37, 1992 S.C. 937 (Can.). However, the
considerable discretion built into the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
allows the federal government to limit its role in this area.
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interest in environmental protection."7 However, there does not
appear to have been an actual increase in the degree of centralization
of decision-making in Canada over the past decade and in fact there
are indications of change in the direction of decentralization. This
ambivalence towards a strong federal presence is particularly evident
in the recent Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization
developed through the Canadian Council of Ministers of the
Environment which indicates that there is pressure for further
decentralization of environmental powers.4"
The constitutional grounds for the use of the federal powers
in CEPA have been uncertain in the past and the federal government
has been unwilling to exploit its original scope.49 However, the
constitutionality of the power of the federal government to regulate
toxic substances was recently upheld by the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Hydro-Quebec °. This may strengthen the federal
government's resolve to regulate in this area. On March 12, 1998, it
tabled Bill C-32 which repeals and replaces CEPA. Many of the
elements are the same as CEPA although there are increased
enforcement powers and potentially stronger powers to regulate toxic
substances. However, there are provisions for sharing power with the
provinces and the federal government has stated that the Bill is
consistent with the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental
Harmonization. As a result, the extent to which the federal
government will attempt to increase its role in environmental
regulation remains to be seen.
47 See Skogstad, supra note 29, at 112-13; Harrison, supra note 29, at 417.
48 The Accord along with its sub-agreements on standards, investigations
and environmental assessments is designed to set a framework for how provincial
and federal roles in the area of the environment are to be meshed. It has been the
focus of criticism by environmental groups who believe the federal government is
essentially backing out of a strong role in environmental protection by assigning
such powers as the implementation of standards to the provinces.
49 See Northey, supra note 35, at 127-28.
50 See R. v. Hydro-Quebec [1997] S.C.R. 213.
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B. Decentralization and Interest Group Power
These differences in the division of powers between the
federal and provincial or state governments in Canada and the U.S.
can have an effect on the nature of regulatory outcomes, largely
through influencing the responsiveness of the regulatory system to
various interests. The overlap ofjurisdictions in Canada with respect
to the environment provides interest groups with an extra point of
access to the system at the policy-making stage.5 ' When one of the
levels of government does not respond to their concerns, they can
attempt to realize the same result at another level, although this has
been limited in Canada because the primary powers have been
exercised by the provincial government with the federal government
not taking a particular active role in many areas.52 This can also be
used to delay legislation through attacks on the jurisdiction of the
level of government issuing the regulation. This reduces the cost of
access to some extent in Canada relative to the U.S. where much of
the environmental policymaking is undertaken at the federal level.
Centralization can also affect incentives facing parties
concerned with environmental law through influencing the relative
costs and power of interest groups. This can occur through impacts
on organizational costs for interest groups, the relative power of
various parties and the extent of inter-jurisdictional externalities.
1. Organizational Costs
A group wishing to influence environmental law and policy
must organize to apply pressure at each level of government at which
decisions are made. In Canada, the degree of decentralization means
51 See Weaver & Rockman, supra note 3, at 31-32.
52 The extra access points would be particularly evident where there is
"competitive federalism" (both the federal and provincial jurisdictions competing
for control) and high public interest. This has not really been the case in the area
of environmental control except perhaps in 1970 and the late 1980s. See Skogstad
& Kopas, supra note 38, at 53-54.
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that there are potentially eleven governments which have to be
accessed by environmental groups on most issues. The greater the
degree of decentralization across jurisdictions, the higher the cost of
action. 3 While this affects both environmental groups and industry,
"effective representation may be less a function of comparative
resources than of attainment of a critical mass of skills, resources and
experience". 4 Industry is able to mount effective representation at
any level because it typically has resources and the organizational
frameworks (such as industry associations) already in place for other
purposes.5 It also has the incentive to invest in reducing or
forestalling regulation because the costs are generally concentrated on
a smaller number of parties. However, public interest groups facing
the higher transaction costs of needing to organize at each level may
be unable to amass sufficient interest and resources to attain the
"critical mass", particularly where the benefits of action are small
and/or wide-spread. They face a budget constraint in their attempts
at organization. A national public interest group, on the other hand,
may be able to take advantage of economies of scale in organizing to
obtain sufficient support for the issue across the country to interest
regulators, especially where they are already organized for other
reasons or causes. In addition to the higher organizational costs from
decentralization, there are both higher information costs (as each
environmental group attempts to cover essentially the same ground)
and potentially higher costs of obtaining resources (due to economies
of scale in fund raising and the fact that national environmental
groups may be able to raise money for matters across jurisdictions).
The one caveat is that where decisions are made at the federal level,
53 This is different from greater powers of access at a single jurisdictional
level which lowers costs of access by providing groups at a given level with a
number of avenues of influence.
54 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids ofSacrifice? Problems of Federalism
in Mandating State Implementation ofNationalEnvironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.
J. 1196, 1214 (1977).
55 See id. at 1213-14; Steven G. Gey, The PoliticalEconomy of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17 REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 50 (1989).
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a public interest group addressing a truly local issue in which no other
group in other jurisdictions is likely to be interested may be
disadvantaged since it may be difficult to attain sufficient size to
interest national legislators.
Environmental groups may thus be more likely to be effective
on a national level since there are lower marginal costs to such action.
Industry, on the other hand, will be able to act at either level. The
decentralized nature of environmental decision-making in Canada
creates a hurdle to environmental groups by raising costs of
organizing and information relative to industry, unlike the U.S. where
national environmental groups can focus their efforts on federal
policymakers. This may explain why there is a proliferation of
national environmental groups in the U.S. with significant resources
and why the majority of effective interest group action in the U.S.
occurs on a national level.56 Conversel, environmental groups in
Canada were generally small provincial organizations throughout the
1970s and 1980s.17 The main groups were centred in Ontario and
British Columbia, partially due to the lower costs of organization in
these large provinces. The relatively small size and limited resources
of these groups may limit their ability to obtain the interest of
regulators. For example, in the acid rain debate the Canadian
Coalition on Acid Rain faced the task of forming a coalition of a large
number of small interest groups in order to attain sufficient size to
affect policy and obtain funding from the provincial and federal
governments."
56 See R. SHEPMELNICK, REGULATIONS AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT 562-63 (1983); Stewart, supra note 54, at 1214-15.
57 See Stewart Elgie, Environmental Groups and the Courts: 1970-1992, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND BUSINESS IN CANADA, supra note 4, at 173, 185-90.
58 See Jurgen Schmandt et al., Negotiations in AcidRain, in ACID RAIN AND
UNFRIENDLY NEIGHBOURS: THE POLICY DISPUTE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES 64, 79 (Jurgen Schmandt et al. eds., 1988).
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2. Relative Power
A controversial theory of industry power in decision-making
holds that decentralization leads to a "race to the bottom" in terms of
environmental law. The basic theory behind the "race for the bottom"
is that where environmental decision-making is decentralized and
industry is mobile, states or provinces will be forced to reduce
environmental regulation below what they regard as socially optimal
in order to compete for industry.59 The pressure on governments to
sustain or promote economic growth enables business to secure lower
environmental standards through threat of leaving or not locating in
the jurisdiction. The result according to this theory is that all states
or provinces end up with lower levels of environmental regulation
than they desire or could achieve if they had agreed not to compete on
the basis of environmental standards.60 Competition can take place
over standard-setting, implementation or enforcement. The federal
government is viewed as better able to make policy trade-offs since
it is less susceptible to pressures by a particular industry where that
industry is less important to overall economic growth than to the
growth of the smaller jurisdiction. This leads to the conclusion that
the federal government should set
59 This is a form of "prisoners' dilemma" in which each party would be
better off if they could credibly agree to a solution. In absence of such agreement,
the solution which is arrived at is the worst for all parties. For clear expositions of
the nature of this theory, see ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 39-41. See
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race
to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1210, 1213-21 (1992).
60 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 38-42. Author notes that this
mobility may be over-emphasized as there is empirical literature which indicates
that interstate environmental policy differences are not a major determinant of
industry location. However, it need not be the case that firms actually move for
this theory to hold. The important factor is that the decision-maker believes that
industry will either not locate there or will move as a result of more stringent
environmental regulations.
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standards so that a higher level of social welfare can be reached than
would be possible where jurisdictions compete away environmental
standards.
This theory has considerable salience in the Canadian
environmental regulatory debate where critics have argued that
provinces' heavy reliance on single industries and the large number
of one company towns implies that industry will have considerable
influence over provincial regulators." For example, in the early
1970s the intention of the federal government was to create nation-
wide minimum effluent standards for the pulp and paper industry but
because at the time there was no public pressure on the government
to engage in enforcement,6' the federal government was willing and
able to delegate enforcement to most of the provinces. Given the
importance of the pulp and paper industry to the economies of many
provinces,63 this delegation is seen as having led to weak and
inconsistent enforcement of the limits and a wide variance in
outcomes between and within provinces. There was a lack of
enforcement of the Fisheries Act provisions at both the federal and
the provincial level throughout the 1970s and 1980s, both in terms of
number of convictions and size of fines.' Provinces were seen as
responding to the pressures from the pulp and paper industry not to
enforce standards or to grant extensions. 5
61 See Skogstad & Kopas, supra note 38, at 47; Hoberg, Alternative Styles,
supra note 4. Grace Skogstad argues that the same influence is felt by the federal
government, see Skogstad, supra note 29, at 108-09.
62 See Skogstad & Kopas, supra note 38, at 46-47.
63 For a description of the importance of the pulp and paper to the economies
of the various provinces and Canada as a whole, see WILLIAM F. SINCLAIR,
CONTROLLING POLLUTION FROM CANADIAN PULP AND PAPER MANUFACTURERS: A
FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE 10 (1990).
6 See, e.g., Skogstad & Kopas, supra note 38, at 48; Nemetz et al., supra
note 14, at 567-68.
65 See, e.g., DOUG MAC DONALD, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 233 (1991)
(a discussion of the exemptions granted in Ontario to the Kimberly-Clark of
Canada Ltd. plant in Terrace Bay).
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The controversial nature of this "race to the bottom" theory,
however, comes not from the competition between jurisdictions over
environmental regulation per se or from industry indicating that it
may be forced to leave or go out of business if certain environmental
costs are imposed, but from the argument that there is a race to the
"bottom". The competition for industry could be seen as part of a
normal, valuable trade-offin which jurisdictions compete for business
and through such competition make decisions as to the price in terms
of economic growth that they are willing to pay for a given level of
environmental quality. Such competition may, in certain
circumstances, lead to an efficient allocation of resources which
maximizes social welfare rather than a suboptimally lax level of
environmental protection.6 This possibly finds support in recent
literature which argues that regulation can actually cause harm in the
form of adverse health effects and reduced social welfare through
causing unemployment which in turn leads to poverty and poorer
health.67 Regulations to increase safety may do more harm than good
in certain circumstances and industry information on the effects of the
regulations, particularly whether it will leave or shut down or not
locate in a jurisdiction, is important. Moreover if the federal
government does step in and mandate environmental protection
levels, states or provinces may simply compete in other areas such as
occupational health and safety regulation.6" In such cases, it would
only be through vesting total power in the federal government that
such competition would cease. 9
6 See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition
Among Jurisdictions, 35 J. PUB. EcON. 333, 336-38 (1988).
67 See Ralph L. Kenney, MortalityRisks Induced byEconomicExpenditures,
10 RISK ANALYSIS 147, 156 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional
Moments and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 265-66 (1996).
68 See Revesz, supra note 59, at 1244-47.
69 One counter argument is that such models have very strict competitive
assumptions including that in equilibrium there are no excess profits for industry.
However, where there are excess profits for an industry, inter-jurisdictional
competition means that industry will shift jurisdictions in order to preserve the
excess profits. It would be more efficient and a better use of resources for
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Whether or not competition is desirable in the sense of setting
optimal policy, the degree of decentralization of decision-making
does have an influence on the resulting environmental law.
Regulations on an industry will likely be less stringent in a
decentralized system where that industry is more important to the
economy of a subnational unit (such as a province or state) than to the
federal government. This is not necessarily because of rent-seeking
but simply because the costs of regulation are higher for the smaller
jurisdiction which militates in favour of less stringent controls. For
example, to the extent that the forestry and mining industries are a
driving force of the economy of B.C., the B.C. government is more
likely than the federal government to take into account threats by
those industries of leaving or of investing in other jurisdictions. The
federal government is concerned with economic growth and the
environment of Canada as a whole when deciding environmental
policy and, even though the forestry and mining industries are likely
to be important in this consideration, they are only two of a number
of competing industries desiring recognition." The importance of
industry to the decision-makers may increase even more as policy
making authority is shifted down to the municipal level. A one-
company town may be unwilling to impose any regulation on the
company in order to ensure that it stays. Of course, there will be
areas for which the particular industry is less important for the
smaller jurisdiction (the town or province) than for the broader
jurisdiction. Inthose cases the smallerjurisdiction would be expected
jurisdictions to have the power to extract those excess profits to use in aid of
environmental protection (that is, either through a direct tax or through a more
stringent set of environmental policies). See ROSE -ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at
40-42. Federal standards in such a case would allow such resources to be used for
that purpose by ending competition over environmental standards. However, this
does solve the problem that the industry will then simply demand concessions in
other areas of provincial jurisdiction.
70 However, this may not hold where the particular region, province or state
is given preferential status or consideration within the national government.
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to set the more stringent standards. This trade-off between the power
of a particular group and the efficiency of the standard will be
explored more fully below.
A related issue is that as the decision is decentralized to
smaller jurisdictions, the power of industry increases because, in
many cases, industry will have an increasing resource advantage over
the decision-maker.71 The principal effect of this advantage is that the
government will be relatively less able to obtain information on its
own about the effects of imposing regulations or to undertake
enforcement. It will be forced to rely to a greater extent on industry
information about the nature of risks and the level of industry
compliance and industry has the opportunity to downplay both the
risk and the degree of non-compliance, particularly where the issue
is very complex and the cost of obtaining information is high. The
Canadian government attempted to overcome this effect of
decentralization by taking on an informational role in the 1970s and
1980s. However, it still relied to a considerable extent on industry
information and had difficulty in obtaining information on
compliance.
As a positive matter, the increase in the importance and
resource advantage of industry as decision-making is decentralized
would be expected, all other things being equal, to lead to
environmental standards becoming less stringent. This is most
pronounced when an industry is more important economically to the
smallerjurisdiction but the tendency is also present in other cases due
to the rent-seeking opportunities provided by the informational
advantage of industry.
3. Inter-jurisdictional Externalities
Decentralization can allow decisions to be made by those
directly impacted by the effects of environmental regulation rather
71 A municipality will have fewer resources to undertake environmental
regulation than will a province which in turn is likely to have less than the federal
government.
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than by relying on national uniform standards. However, where
environmental effects are inter-jurisdictional, decentralization can
lead to under-regulation because costs are shifted to those outside the
jurisdiction. These costs include not only direct health and
environmental effects but also impact on use or existence values for
those in other jurisdictions.7" The individuals who are effected by
these externalities but do not live in the jurisdiction have no recourse
to policy-makers, as they have few or no rights within the jurisdiction
and have no voting power. Regulators simply weigh the costs and
benefits to those within the jurisdiction and can often safely ignore
other interests. In addition, for inter-jurisdictional problems
decentralization raises the costs of action of interest groups as they
are forced to attempt to deal in a number of different jurisdictions
with essentially the same problem.
The classic example is acid rain controls in Canada and the
U.S. Canada faces almost the full impact of its sulphur dioxide
emissions while the U.S. has been recognized as the source of 50
percent of the acid rain in Canada.' Canada moved first on the issue,
partially because it bore the full brunt of its economic activity (as well
as seeking to influence U.S. policy). Even within the U.S.,
externalities affected the debate as it pitted the midwestern states
which exported acid rain against eastern states which were impacted
by the acid rain, with the eastern states acting on the problem even
before the federal government.74
72 For example, there is a concern for old growth forests in British Columbia
and Northern Ontario by people who do not live in those provinces, let alone have
visited the areas in question. There is a question of how much weight should be
given to these concerns or how they should be expressed (such as through votes,
participation or through allowing purchases of parcels of disputed land) but they
do exist and neglecting them ignores a cost of economic activity.
73 See Kim J. Deridder, The Nature and Effects ofAcid Rain, in ACID RAIN
AND UNFRIENDLY NEIGHBOURS: THE POLICY DISPUTE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 58, at 31, 45.
74 See Barbara Britton et al., The U.S. Policy Response to AcidRain, in ACID
RAIN AND UNFRIENDLYNEIGHBOURS: THE POLICY DISPUTE BETWEEN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 58, at 107, 129-13 1; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
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4. Decentralization and Stringency
The degree of decentralization of a regulatory system can
affect the incentives and relative powers of various group.
Essentially, for an activity which has a certain distribution of benefits
(such as economic growth and jobs) and costs (health and general
environmental effects), more decentralized decision-making should
lead to less stringent environmental law because environmental
groups are less able to act, industry is more important in certain cases
to the jurisdiction and has a greater relative resource advantage over
government and the wider costs are less likely to be taken into
account. The greater the importance of the industry to the smaller
jurisdiction relative to the broader jurisdiction and the greater the
inter-jurisdictional externalities, this effect is more pronounced.
There is an off-setting benefit to decentralization. Where the
effects are local, decentralized decision making will be better able to
take into account the relative costs and benefits between jurisdictions
as opposed to broader uniform standards. Uniform standards are
based on the assumption that there is no added benefit from
increasing quality where it is already better than the standard and that
improvement in quality where it is worse than the standard is always
worth the cost.75 Both countries attempt to overcome these problems
by balancing some form of national standards with provincial or state
implementation. The U.S. government attempts to overcome this
problem through use of strong national standards along with EPA-
monitored state enforcement. The Canadian system is based on
unenforceable standards for which compliance is negotiated on a
case-by-case basis by the provinces, which allows for greater
consideration of cost differences.76 However, while this may work in
some cases, national standards may be rendered meaningless where
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN AIR DIRTY COAL 44-54 (1981).
75 See D. N. DEWEES ET AL., ONTARIO ECONOMIC COUNCIL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 134-35 (1975).
76 See ROsE-ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 3 8-42; Nemetz et al., supra note
14, at 595.
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a province refuses to enforce the regulations or follow the guidelines.
The Canadian government does not have, or has been unwilling to
use, the power to effectively monitor provincial enforcement of
standards.77
The positive claim is then that the greater decentralization of
Canadian decision-making should lead to less stringent regulation
than in the U.S., particularly where there are inter-jurisdictional
externalities and the regulated party is important to the smaller
jurisdiction. The difficulty is the normative issue of determining the
appropriate degree of decentralization of decision-making. This
depends on the nature of the issue. The argument in favour of smaller
jurisdictions being able to make trade-offs between economic growth
and environmental risk only works for an efficient market, that is, one
in which all interests are included in the decision. The danger is that
in certain cases the structure of government permits rent-seeking or
excludes relevant interests.
The key is the nature of the issue and the relative strength of
the parties. Table 1 sets out the factors which favour locating
decision-making power at either the provincial or the federal level.
An issue for which the organization/resource and information costs
are high for public interest groups (because the industry concerned is
more important to the provincial economy than to the federal
economy, the costs of the regulator obtaining the necessary
information are high, the effects are extra-territorial and the cost of
uniform standards is low) is better handled at the federal level as the
interests of all relevant parties are more likely to be taken into
account. While there are likely to be very few issues for which such
factors are so clearly divided, this table does illustrate the trade-offs
which have to be made.
77 See, e.g., MAC DONALD, supra note 65 (discussing non-enforcement by
the provinces of standards under the Fisheries Act).
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FACTORS AFFECTING CHOICE OF DECISION-MAKING































For example, where the effects are more local than the policy-
makers' jurisdiction, such as in the case of certain waste dumps under
provincial control, environmental groups' and industry's interests
may be adequately considered. The costs of information would likely
be lower than some more complicated issues relating to chemicals
(although they can still be quite high as the proponent of the waste
site may undertake a large number of studies to illustrate the lack of
risk and the public interest group has to rebut these results). The
largest costs are imposed on a small group of people which should
increase the incentive for these parties to act. The effects are likely
local and there could be high cost from uniform standards (as a result
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of governing every waste dump as if the costs and benefits of control
were identical). The waste disposal industry may have more
provincial power given the nature of the issue, but this is not clear.
As a result, control over such an issue should likely rest with the
province. On the other hand, for an issue such as the emissions of
dioxins and furans from the pulp and paper industry, federal
regulation may be more appropriate as the costs on the public would
be widespread and hard to determine (making the organization and
information costs for such groups high), the pulp and paper industry's
very importance to the economies of a number of provinces (likely
more so than to the country as a whole), the effects can be extra-
territorial and the information costs to the regulators may be high.
The only factor which may point in the other direction is the cost of
uniform standards which may be high where they do not take into
account variations in location where appropriate. These examples,
while not worked in detail, illustrate that the optimal level for
decision-making (and whether or not the tendency towards less
stringency as decisions are decentralized is optimal), depends on the
effects of these factors in the particular instance.78
V. Incentives and Environmental Law
The greater number of points of access and the increased
rights of public participation in the U.S., when combined with the
effects of centralization on interest group costs and power, lead to
lower transaction costs and higher marginal benefit for environmental
groups. Where the benefits to action for a group are low and diffuse
as they often are for parties affected by environmental risks, the lower
78 One problem with some discussions of the "race to the bottom" is that
they consider federal standards to be imposing a "supra-market price" and state
standards to be permitting a competitive trade-off. See Revesz, supra note 59, at
1244-47. However this assumes that the state is the best location for the
competition. Even if decisions are made at a federal level there will be competition
(between nations) for business. Similarly, states can be imposing too high a price
where they are deciding issues which are much more local in effect.
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costs of action in the U.S. make it more likely than in Canada that
such groups will act. Moreover, American legislators are less
insulated from the demands of public interest groups and both
Congress and the president are in competition to ensure that they are
seen to best reflect the demands of the public, unlike the
Parliamentary system which essentially gives all of the power to the
Cabinet.
The result is that while in both countries the regulated parties
have significant access rights and the resources to use them, the
structure of institutions makes environmental groups more powerful
in the U.S. This should lead to more stringent environmental
regulations in the U.S. for two reasons. First, environmental groups
will be able to put greater pressure on legislators (and bureaucrats)
through indicating they can affect public support for legislators. If
legislators believe public interest groups represent voters, they will
respond to this pressure. This is obviously only as effective as the
number of votes that the legislators believe is represented by the
interest group. It can be given greater credibility or added weight
through public education programs by the public interest groups.
Second, environmental groups can provide regulators with
information about the benefits of environmental control. As was
noted above, there is no objective measure of risk which would allow
regulators to determine the "true" risk of an environmental hazard.79
Risk as determined by experts and risk as perceived by the public can
differ. Where regulators only have information concerning experts'
assessments of risk, they will be making risk decisions based on
incomplete information.8" Because the American institutional
structure provides incentives for the public and public interest groups
79 See BREYER, supra note 21, at 42-45.
so Risk as determined by experts and as perceived by the public can differ
either because experts may not take into account the qualitative nature of the risk
as perceived by the public or because the public has "rationality" problems due to
such factors as the use of heuristics. The effect of these two types of differences
will be discussed below. For an overview of the nature of these differences, see
BREYER, supra note 21, at 9-10; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 52-55.
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to act and for legislators and bureaucrats to take such actions into
account, these risk perceptions are received and taken into account to
a larger extent than in Canada.
The effect of this access on the resulting allowable risk levels
depends on the direction of differences between the perceived risk
and the risk as determined by experts. In some cases, the perceived
risk could be less than the risk as determined by experts. However,
it seems less likely that interest groups would intervene to increase
levels of allowable risk as concentrated interests (the regulated
parties) would already be pushing for relaxed limits in both
countries." The relative isolation of Canadian regulators should lead
to greater willingness to allow environmental risks because
policymakers have less information on those factors which are
important to those adversely affected by regulation.
Information provided by public interest groups can
theoretically also provide evidence that industry's compliance costs
are less than it has claimed or that there are better methods of
reducing certain forms ofpollution. This helps offset the information
provided by regulated parties. However, this role is limited due to the
lack of resources for environmental groups to gather such
information, especially in Canada prior to the mid 1980s when
environmental groups were typically small and poorly funded.
The timing of the institutional change in Canada corresponds
to the differences in stringency of environmental law between Canada
and the U.S. Canada's environmental law was, in general, much less
stringent than that in the U.S. in the 1970s and early 1980s in terms
of standards and controls over polluters (as evidenced by emission
levels). 2 Stringency of environmental regulation converged in the
latter half of the 1980s with Canada "catching up" to the U.S. in
s, For an exception discussing the development of policies on saccharin in
Canada and the U.S., see HARRISON & HOBERG, supra note 19, at 85-98.
82 See Hoberg, Comparing, supra note 2, at 25 1. See generally M. FRANSON
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL OF ALBERTA, ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: A
COMPARISON OF CANADIAN STANDARDS, STANDARD-SETTING PROCESSES AND
ENFORCEMENT (1982).
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many areas. 3 While other factors likely played some role (as
discussed above), increased public participation played an important
part in this convergence."
This general pattern is reflected in specific policy areas. For
example, the Canadian federal government set effluent standards for
the pulp and paper industry under the Fisheries Act in 1971. These
were much less stringent than the U.S. federal standards over the
same period and applied only to mills built, modified or expanded
after 1971, whereas the U.S. regulations applied to all mills." These
regulations were the result of a compromise between provincial,
federal and industry representatives with no public input, since there
was no right of access for public interest groups at the time. 6
Moreover, the standards were set largely using industry supplied
information, particularly on the economic effect of such regulation.8
The U.S. regulations, on the other hand, were set in the context of
much greater public involvement.8 8 In 1992, the federal government
set new Canadian regulations which included significantly tighter
limits on effluents from pulp and paper mills, contained greater
enforcement powers for federal regulators and applied to all mills
(with a phase-in period). Unlike the earlier Canadian regulations,
these new regulations were the result of extensive consultations by
the federal government with both industry and the public stemming
from the increased openness of the federal government in the mid-
1980s.89
83 SeeHoberg, Comparing, supranote2at251. Seegenerally Green, Public
Participation, supra note 2.
84 See generally Green, Public Participation, supra note 2.
85 See generally GREEN, CENTER FOR STUDY, supra note 5.
86 See David VanderZwaag & Brenda McLuhan, Pulp andPaper Pollution:
Shifting Legal Approaches and the Search for Sustainable Industries, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND BUSINESS IN CANADA, supra note 4, at 479, 507-09.
87 See Skogstad & Kopas, supra note 38, at 47.
88 See generally Green, Public Participation, supra note 2.
89 See VanderZwaag & McLuhan, supranote 86, at 507-09; Nancy Olewiler,
The Impact ofEnvironmental Regulation on Investment Decisions, in GETTING THE
GREEN LIGHT: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND INVESTMENT IN CANADA 53, 92
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As a result, while the pulp and paper regulations in Canada
were set at the federal level, the lack of public participation compared
to the U.S. led to less stringent regulations based on what was likely
the same information as to the costs of regulation, since industry in
both countries had full access to regulators. In addition, enforcement
of these standards was largely delegated to the provinces and this had
a large effect on the compliance rate of industry (which was lower in
Canada than the U.S.) because of the power of industry relative to
public interest groups.90 For example, the controls in B.C. and
Quebec, where the industry is very important, were the weakest for
those pollutants which are most costly to control in those provinces
(total suspended solids in B.C. and bio-chemical oxygen demand in
Quebec).
91
The regulations of dioxins in pulp and paper effluent in the
late 1980s is also informative. Many of the provinces, including
B.C., Ontario, Alberta and Quebec, set their own limits for dioxins
which were much stricter than the federal standard.92 The U.S. is
setting standards which are likely to be stricter than the Canadian
federal standard.93 Both the federal and provincial governments were
subject to public pressure for regulation spurred on by a large public
relations campaign by Green Peace.94 The provinces, however,
responded with tighter standards which illustrates that leaving
standard-setting and enforcement to the provinces will not always
result in less stringent standards. There did not appear to be a "race
to the bottom" but the key was that there was an organization (Green
Peace) which was able to provide information to the public and bring
(Jamie Benidickson ed., 1994).
90 See Skogstad & Kopas, supra note 38, at 43; Peter N. Nemetz, Federal
Environmental Regulation in Canada, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 551,582-83 (1986).
91 See generally Green, Public Participation, supra note 2.
92 See id.
93 See HARRISON & HOBERG, RISK, supra note 19, at 51.
94 See id. at 14.
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their concerns to the government. However, it took an organization
which had international connections and large resources to raise
sufficient public concern to affect the policy.
The effect of public participation can also be seen in the
example of sulphur dioxide emissions. Prior to the mid 1980s,
Canadian national "objectives" for sulphur dioxide emissions were
lower than those in the U.S. However, these objectives were
unenforceable and the main power rested with the provinces. As a
result, the emissions levels in Canada in the 1970s and early 1980s
were much higher than in the U.S., indicating that the U.S. exerted
more control over industry.9" However, Canadian emissions were
reduced to a much greater extent than U.S. emissions in the late
1980s, resulting in Canadian emissions "catching up" to U.S.
emissions.
A principal factor was significant pressure by environmental
groups. In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was little public access
to the decision-making process in controlling sources of air
emissions. However, in the early 1980s the Canadian Coalition on
Acid Rain joined together a number of small local interest groups to
put pressure on government to control acid rain. Federal and
provincial funds helped them build sufficient support to exert
effective pressure. 96  This public pressure was significant in
convincing the federal government to take action against sulphur
dioxide emissions in 1985.' In the U.S., there was significant public
pressure for control of sulphur dioxide emissions over the whole
period, although a complex relationship of regional politics led to
some unfortunate compromises in the 1970s and to a delay in action
95 See generally Green, Public Participation, supra note 2.
9 See Tom Albin & Steve Paulson, Environmental and Economic Interests
in Canada and the United States, in ACID RAIN AND UNFRIENDLY NEIGHBOURS:
THE POLICY DISPUTE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 58,
at 107, 129-3 1.
97 See generally Hoberg, Sleeping, supra note 3.
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in the U.S. until the 1980s.9" This example shows that external
funding or aid (in this case in the form of federal and provincial
funding to the Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain) is necessary to
ensure interest groups in a decentralized system attain sufficient
power to exert pressure and provide information.
The example of sulphur dioxide omissions also indicates that
public participation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
stringent regulation. Although both countries had extensive public
interest group pressure, it was unable by itself to bring strong action
in the U.S. due to industry efforts. Institutional factors only lead to
a tendency in a certain direction for a particular system. Industry still
has considerable power to rent-seek under the U.S. system due to its
resource advantage over environmental groups (which also permits
greater use ofjudicial review and access provisions), its informational
advantage over the government and interest groups and the
decentralization of some environmental decisions. The rent-seeking
opportunities inherent in the nature of the regulatory systems in both
countries are very important in determining policy outcomes.
VI. Implications for Environmental Law and Policy
One important factor in understanding why environmental
regulation in Canada as a whole has been, and continues to be in
many areas, less stringent than in the U.S. is the institutional structure
in Canada for making environmental law. Canada's closed,
decentralized system has led to industry having a greater ability than
public interest groups to influence environmental policy. The recent
move towards public participation is beneficial in helping balance the
information and pressure received by policy-makers, although this
continues to be off-set by the decentralized nature of environmental
regulatory power in Canada.
98 See Barbara et al., supra note 74, at 159-182; ACKERMAN & HASSLER
supra note 74, at 44-54.
2071999]
208 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 6
A. Irrationalities and Interest Groups
Given this analysis of the effect of the increase in public
participation in Canada, is such participation an unquestionable
benefit? Public participation is only a benefit if it makes
environmental law and policy "better."99  While increased
participation by the pubic can help offset the power of industry, it is
important to examine the nature of public demands for risk reduction
to determine how it impacts risk regulation decisions.
The principal concern about public participation arises
because of the nature of the public's perception of risks. As was
noted above, there can be significant differences in the priority or
ranking that the public gives to risk as opposed to that which
scientists or regulators place on the same risk. For example, a
Canadian study recently provided evidence that the public ranks risks
from chemical pollution, ozone depletion, nuclear wastes, pesticides
and PCBs higher than toxicologists while it ranks smoking and motor
vehicle accidents as less risky than experts.'00
This difference can occur in two ways. First, individuals may
have "rationality" problems due to such factors as age, addiction and
the use of heuristics.' These place limits on individuals' ability to
process information and rationally understand the risk or
99 Public participation could have a negative effect on environmental law and
policy yet still be desired because it enhances democracy. However, this paper is
only considering the effect of institutional change on outcomes, that is, the
stringency of environmental law.
100 See Paul Slovic et al., Intuitive Toxicology II: Expert and Lay Judgments
of Chemical Risks in Canada, 15 RISK ANALYsIs 661, 674 (1996).
101 Heuristics are techniques used to process information but which can lead
to a misunderstanding of the underlying probabilities. For example, the
"availability" heuristic causes people to overestimate the probability of an
occurrence when a similar event comes readily to their minds (e.g., to overestimate
the probability that their house will be broken into ifa house of someone they know
has been broken into recently). There are other heuristics which can have an effect
on individuals' perception of risk such as anchoring and representativeness.
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opportunities from certain activities.'°2 Second, the public may have
a qualitative sense of the risk which experts do not take into account.
Experts examine the "body count '"' 3 (that is, mortality, morbidity and
the like) which do not take into account aspects of the risk which are
important to the public such as its dreadedness or voluntariness or
whether it affects a particular sub-group (such as children).' 4 These
qualitative aspects to risk are not irrationalities but may be different
understandings of the nature of risk which face individuals.
The qualitative nature of risk represents real concerns about
risk and the benefit which the public derives from its reduction and
as such is an important consideration for policy-makers to take into
account. To the extent public participation brings such qualitative
information before regulators, it will lead to better balancing of costs
and benefits. However, these differences in perceived and "expert"
risk give rise to a problem where the fear engendered in the public is
irrational. Irrationalities exist where the public would have the same
ranking of a risk as the experts if they knew the "correct" probability
or magnitude of the risk but, for some reason, they have miscalculated
the risk. In those cases, the relative influence of public interest
groups may push environmental policies in a direction which is not
optimal.
Irrationalities such as the use of the availability heuristic may
have led to over-regulation of certain risks in the U.S. as a result of
the "pollutant of the month" syndrome.' 5 U.S. legislators and
regulators are unable to (or have no incentive to) withstand public
pressures based on irrationalities. The incentives in the system are for
legislators and bureaucrats to respond to public perceptions (at least
symbolically) and there are a variety of levers to force reluctant
102 See BREYER, supra note 21, at 33-39; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 5, at
56; Sunstein, supra note 67, at 265-66.
103 See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, andAgencies 138
U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1072-74 (1990).
104 See BREYER, supra note 21, at 33-39; Pides & Sunstein, supra note 5, at
57.
105 See BREYER, supra note 21, at 35; Pildes & Sunstein supra note 5, at 57.
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policymakers to take action. As was noted above, it is unlikely that
there would be often a push by the public towards under-regulation
since concentrated interests are able to take effective action on their
own to this end. As a result of the lack of power of policymakers to
withstand public pressure based on irrationalities, the system can be
pushed towards over-regulation by a public overly concerned about
the level of risk."6
Interestingly the U.S. seems to be one stage "ahead" of
Canada in terms of regulatory institutions, at least the way the debate
is currently moving in terms of public participation. The U.S.
previously had a regime of state power over regulation with
considerable discretion being granted to administrators." 7 This was
partially the result of a confidence in the ability of such administrators
to act in the public interest. In the late 1960s, however, the public
lost this confidence and there was a demand for centralization of
power and greater controls over the actions of regulators."°8 The
result was the current U.S. system of limited discretion, spiraling
legalism, federal decision-making and openness with its attendant risk
of over-emphasis of minimal risks. This system led to more stringent
regulation than in Canada over the comparable period which largely
retained administrative discretion and provincial power. However,
U.S. environmental regulatory regime was criticized for being
inflexible and not cost-effective and for hindering rational priority-
setting. The U.S. is now trying to reduce the adverse incentives built
into the regulatory system, possibly through extending greater
discretion to regulators.
The Canadian debate appears to be at the same stage now as
the U.S. was at the end of the 1960s with decreasing trust in
regulators leading to a desire to limit discretion and develop
106 One example of this effect in Canada may be the recent move, based in
part on public pressure, to increase Canadian automobile emission controls
possibly above those in the U.S., even though it may not be optimal. See generally
Green, Public Participation, supra note 2.
107 See Elgie, supra note 57, at 197; Sunstein, supra note 67, at 254.
log See Sunstein, supra note 67, at 255.
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environmental rights. Under the Canadian system regulators in the
past had the power to withstand irrational public demands because of
strict party discipline, little effective parliamentary opposition on
many complex issues and insufficient access to the policy process by
public interest groups to enable them to impress such perception on
policy makers. Unfortunately, at the same time Canadian legislators
and bureaucrats were not receiving information on qualitative
differences in risk and this led to a tendency towards under-regulation
of certain risks.'0 9
Given the different bases for public perceptions of risk, the
push for greater public participation in Canada is valuable to the
extent that it provides regulators with qualitative risk information.
The difficulty is in sorting out irrationalities from qualitative
concerns. Public participation should be encouraged but a system
must be developed which provides incentives for policymakers to
respond to qualitative information and at the same gives them the
discretion to resist irrational public perceptions. Importation of
public participation structures from the U.S. could bring with it the
tendency of the American system towards over-regulation on the
basis of irrational public demand. Current public participation rights
have been grafted on to the Canadian system without any discussion
of the safeguards and institutional features the U.S. is starting to
recognize are necessary to ensure that the incentives arising from
interest group action are not harmful to the policy making process.
B. Decentralization of Canadian Environmental Law
and Policy
The effect of the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental
Harmonization is unclear in many areas. For example, the sub-
agreement on standards appears not to clarify the roles of the federal
and provincial governments given that the "responsible" government
109 See generally HARRISON & HOBERG, RISK, supra note 19 (a general
discussion of Alar and how risk perception affects public policy).
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is to implement the standards with the federal government responsible
for, among other things, regulation based on a "product/substance"
approach and the provinces for implementing measures "requiring
action from industrial, municipal and other sectors". It is uncertain
how these overlapping areas will be harmonized. There have been
attempts to use cooperation between the federal and provincial
governments where comprehensive legislation is not possible, either
through mutual legislation, federal-provincial committees or by
delegation of administrative powers (such as in the area of
environmental assessments).' How the Accord advances this
process other than by leaning towards even greater provincial
implementation of regulation is unclear.
Moreover, while it appears to aid in setting the appropriate
level of decision-making by letting the province decide on issues
which have intra-territorial effects, this could have the effect of
reducing environmental protection as scope of effect is only one of
the relevant factors to be considered. As was noted above, it is
important to consider the impacts of de-centralization on a case-by-
case basis, including its effect on the relative power of interest
groups, to determine the appropriate jurisdiction for particular
decisions. Although the federal government's willingness to regulate
may be strengthened by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Hydro-Quebec'", the apparent further decentralization of
environmental decision-making under the Accord (for example, by
potentially delegating implementation of standards to the provinces)
1o For example, jurisdiction is shared successfully in the areas of regulation
of pesticides and transportation of hazardous chemicals and precedents for
administrative delegation occur in area of farm marketing boards. See Northey,
supra note 35, at 150-152. There has also been some federal-provincial
cooperation in the attempt to clean up "orphan" hazardous waste sites under the
National Contaminated Sites Remediation Program.
III See R. v. Hydro-Quebec [1997] S.C.R. 213.
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should impact the relative power of groups to effect policy either
through provision of information or pressure on governments to act.
All other things being equal, it should lead to a decrease in stringency
of environmental regulations by decreasing the ability of
environmental groups to influence policy.

